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Time, Money, and Race 
Simone de Beauvoir on American Abstraction 
Shannon M. Mussett 
Utah Valley University 
In a capitalist country, freedom is always deceptive, but even the appearance of 
democracy itself is fading from day to day, and from day to day despotism breaks 
out with increasing impudence. 
—Simone de Beauvoir, America Day by Day 
Introduction 
In 1947, Simone de Beauvoir traveled to the United States for a four-
month stay, during which she toured the country extensively, giving 
numerous lectures, and penning her observations of the country defining the 
post-World War II social and political landscape. Her copious notes taken 
during this time eventually became the travelogue, America Day by Day 
(L’Amérique au jour le jour) as well as a piece written for the May 25, 1947 
edition of the New York Times Magazine, “An Existentialist Looks at 
Americans.” In both of these writings, Beauvoir offers an astute and 
penetrating criticism of American culture from a foreign viewpoint. Although 
she admits that she is an outsider looking in, she also grants that the position 
of the outsider (as she demonstrates in The Second Sex, 1949) provides a unique 
perspective for critique of dominant power structures and social mores. 
Beauvoir’s interpretation of American culture never purports to be 
anything more than a limited view. She does not promise a “serious study” 
but rather a “faithful account” that is only a collection of “indecisions, 
additions, and corrections” that do not claim anything definitive.1 While it is 
a bit disingenuous to deny the gravity of certain passages (such as those on 
American abstraction and race), Beauvoir is clearly not purporting to write a 
work of serious literature or philosophical theory. Thus, it is important to read 
many of her observations on the United States as a first-person experiential 
account that also presents ethical, political, and philosophical subject matter. 
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These observations are more of an expression of the “art of living,” which 
does not approach problems with absolute rules but, as Karen Vintges notes, 
shows life and ethics always in creation.2 In this light, Beauvoir writes mostly 
about how interactions affect her, the thoughts they engender, and the way in 
which a foreign country, language, and culture reveal themselves to her. In 
short, she offers a phenomenological account that opens up to philosophical 
critique, but that does not, in itself, profess to be a work of philosophy. 
The most philosophically rich discussions occur in what Beauvoir 
repeatedly refers to as American “abstraction” and the undeniable presence 
of racial discrimination and oppression. This paper explores Beauvoir’s 
treatment of American abstraction and race with three goals in mind: first, to 
understand the American relationship to time and money as abstractions. 
Ignoring the past and projecting an idealistic (but ultimately vacuous) future, 
leads to a strange kind of fatalism and lack of passion that profoundly impacts 
White and Black Americans, albeit in distinctively different ways. While 
Beauvoir would argue that there is a human tendency toward flight into 
abstraction as a way of avoiding the demands of action, there is something 
unique in how Americans undertake this flight. The second goal is to explore 
these differences through an analysis of how White Americans attempt to live 
with “good” consciences through the positing of and attachment to abstract 
values and things. This attitude, in turn, produces a largely instrumental and 
racist treatment of many populations, in particular Black Americans. The final 
goal focuses on how Beauvoir confronts the fact of her own whiteness, and in 
so doing undergoes the movement of race as an abstract theoretical category 
to one of lived embodiment. In so doing, her ruminations, however limited, 
succeed in sketching a model for existential self-reflection and critique. 
American Abstraction 
America Day by Day and “An Existentialist Looks at Americans” directly 
address the problem of American abstraction. In these works, Beauvoir argues 
that Americans suffer from a lack of concrete experience because they sever 
the vital tie between subject and object. With the elevation of the object into 
an idol, the subject is denigrated into a passive vessel onto which ideology 
can be readily inscribed. The object produces the illusion of unconditional 
meaning but comes at the expense of living human beings who resign 
themselves to a fatalism that denies the possibility to actively shape their 
worlds. Beauvoir finds an enthusiastic, but ultimately hollow promotion of 
empty conceptions of freedom, equality, good, and evil, that morph into a 
kind mythological idealism, giving no ground for the creation of a concrete 
and shared ethical future.  
“An Existentialist Looks at Americans” opens by emphasizing the 
importance of historical consciousness: “according to the philosophy I hold, 
the history of men is the work of men themselves, and concerns no one but 
them; they must make it meaningful; no one else can.”3 Denying that existence 
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is either inherently meaningful or absurd, Beauvoir poses a direct question to 
post-World War II America: “does it provide men with valid reasons for 
living? Does it justify their existence?”4 The question of whether or not 
American society justifies existence is, of course, an impossible question to 
answer—especially from an existential framework that prima facie denies 
universal meaning. The philosophy of ambiguity upholds that the question 
can only be addressed from the position of human beings who are constantly 
negotiating the experience of being free, yet situated, subjects. Our situation 
is entangled in the materiality of our bodies and environments, as well as the 
myriad influences of culture. The ambiguity of existence positions human 
experience between projective movement into the future and the opaque 
weight of the world and others that work against (or for) the actualization of 
freedom.5 In this meeting between project and world, meaning is born. Some 
individuals may be in favorable situations conducive to the expression of 
freedom through transforming the world, and others may simply suffer a loss 
of their transcendence so much so that it takes on the appearance of 
immanence. This describes the state of oppression, and one of the most 
effective ruses of power mystifies people into passive acceptance that such a 
state is natural and not created. 
Beauvoir has a complex philosophy of situated freedom that walks the 
uneasy line between radical freedom and the realities of oppression and 
mystification. Maintaining a double movement of freedom that is both 
productive and destructive of givenness, she is also aware of certain immanent 
expenditures of freedom, what she terms, empty and abstract liberty. These 
latter two expressions help her explore how oppressed existents, while being 
essentially free, can be cut off from meaningful world transformation.6  
Repeatedly throughout her major philosophical works, Beauvoir claims 
that concrete freedom is most fully actualized in creation, production, and 
revolt, insofar as these expressions substantially affect the world and the 
person expressing it. The other expressions of liberty—designated as abstract 
and often discussed in tandem with immanence—appear almost always in 
discussions of oppression. Abstract freedom merely expends itself without 
deeply transforming the existent’s situation. Freedom is thus dissipated, not 
annihilated or denied.7 While Beauvoir tends to discuss this kind of freedom 
in the context of oppression, she also talks about it in terms of mystification, 
understood as a state in which people are conditioned to believe that the 
situation is given by nature and therefore not subject to change. American 
abstraction is best understood through the notion of mystification, which in 
turn creates a surprising predominance of fatalism regarding the status quo. 
The individual, severed from meaningful world engagement, becomes 
passive regarding the future. The mystifying ideology of freedom and 
exceptionalism causes many Americans to docilely submit to a powerful 
elite.8 
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 Initially, America captivates Beauvoir. She finds the technological and 
architectural ingenuity breathtaking in its scope and success. The major 
cities—particularly New York and Chicago—celebrate a kind of diversity that 
she finds lacking in Europe. The varieties of food, music, and regional 
practices found in both urban and rural settings give her pause to celebrate 
the “magnificent triumph of man.” And yet,  
The truth of the world and of man resides in the bond 
between subject and object. To worship the object isolated 
from the subject, to make an idol of the thing itself, is to be 
caught by what we call—following Hegel and Nietzsche—
the spirit of serious-mindedness. There is a tendency in 
America to be fascinated by the bare result without concern 
for the human existence that was staked on it. To an 
Existentialist, this is a grave danger: for since man can only 
find himself by committing himself to the world the loss of 
the one is ever accompanied by the loss of the other.9 
Americans have an obsession with the result of mental and physical labor 
and a distaste bordering on conscious disregard toward its past production 
and future destination.10 As such, they are capable of raising the thing into an 
Absolute, freed from the contingencies of the situation, thereby beyond 
analysis and criticism. This elevation of the result into an abstract beyond is 
central to grasping the dangerousness of the “spirit of serious-mindedness.” 
The world is a human world, endowed with human meaning, a product and 
producer of dynamic human temporality. Ideas and goods do not spring fully 
formed into circulation. Nonetheless, American abstraction proceeds as if this 
were in fact the case. 
 The attitude of seriousness, which is central to Beauvoir’s 
understanding of inauthentic living in her earlier work, The Ethics of Ambiguity 
(1943), involves the active denial of freedom by setting up absolute values to 
shield from the anguish of choice.11 Those who inhabit this all-too-common 
attitude attempt to live a paradox—asserting freedom by choosing a 
meaningful end, yet denying freedom by claiming this end as an 
unconditional authority. The goal takes on the guise of a definitive 
justification for all consequent action, even as spontaneous choice set it up as 
a justification in the first place. Typically, Beauvoir discusses the attitude of 
seriousness in terms of a kind of bad faith—flight into the object (an ideology, 
belief, leader, etc.) submersion of subjectivity therein, and avoidance of the 
anguish of permanent, originary choice.12 From this perspective then, 
oppression is usually conceived as the deliberate objectification of othered 
populations and the dehumanization executed by tyrants who set up ideals 
to which the freedom of others is sacrificed.13 The tyrannical endeavor 
prohibits the oppressed from choosing and enacting their own projects so as 
to feed off this energy to satisfy self-interested ends. This involves cutting 
existents off from projects, their very humanity, which consists most 
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fundamentally in transcending the given into an open future. The oppressed 
is “reduced to pure facticity, congealed in his immanence, cut off from his 
future, deprived of his transcendence and of the world which that 
transcendence discloses.” When this happens, “a man no longer appears as 
anything more than a thing among things.”14  
Americans, according to Beauvoir, have perfected the movement of flight 
into things. Over and over she finds that they cling desperately to the given:  
they see the source of values and truth in things, not in 
themselves. . . . In Hegelian terms, one can say that the 
negation of the subject leads to the triumph of 
understanding over spirit—that is the triumph of 
abstraction. And that is why in this country, which seems 
so doggedly turned toward the concrete, the word 
“abstraction” has come so often to my lips. The object, 
erected as an idol, loses its human truth and becomes an 
abstraction because concrete reality envelops both object 
and subject.15 
The philosophy of ambiguity maintains that the world is disclosed by the 
existent for whom it is manifest, and meaning emerges within that very 
movement. There is no intrinsic meaning in the subject or the object before the 
encounter itself. So clearly, to maintain that the source of value can be found 
out there, in the world, belies the movement of ambiguous, embodied 
existence. This denial breeds existential myopia and deep social divisions as 
it forecloses serious analysis and discussion.  
Part of what makes Americans so susceptible to abstraction is that they 
fear honest self-critique and loathe feelings of guilt and responsibility that 
might awaken them to their own participation in oppressive practices. 
Beauvoir periodically muses on the desire of Americans to be in their own 
good graces. She attributes this to a kind of moral puritanism that makes 
“clear distinctions between Good and Evil, between True and False,” in which 
“ideas have consequences, but . . . are also avoided.”16 Americans will act, but 
only when motivated by a kind of impossible ideological purity; they do not 
want to commit to anything ambiguous or mired in historical contradictions. 
As there is no action that is not so situated, they must assert a false sense of 
purity and rightness. Although Americans are “not cynical” they hate having 
“a bad conscience. Hence, the great ‘American dilemma.’”17 
This allergy toward the complexity of ambiguity can be seen in the 
materialistic cult of objects rampant in society. The public at large is guilty of 
worshiping the result of labor without concerning itself with the human 
existence that was employed in its creation. The obsession with the mere 
practical and instrumental results of action leads to the two leading challenges 
facing American society: its abstract relationship to time and money. 
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Regarding time, Americans are addicted to an empty stream of 
disconnected moments that offer nothing except the fleeting pleasure of their 
destruction: “They have no project, passion, nostalgia, or hope that engages 
them beyond the present; they know only the indefinite repetition of the cycle 
of hours and seasons. But cut off from the past and future, the present no 
longer has any substance; it’s nothing, just a pure, empty now.”18 As such, 
Americans are caught in a cycle of desire for more frequent and intense 
gadgets, amusements, and stimuli. The latest product, the latest method, the 
latest fad—map on to a decadent and corrupt national character that is 
insatiable in its quest for novelty. Since these objects are free-floating, largely 
divorced from the time of their creation and ultimate destination, they are 
abstractions. This makes them easily disconnected and utterly expendable, 
creating calamity for those who elevate these abstractions into idols.  
A more authentic attitude (one that is not adrift amidst disconnected 
abstractions) requires vigilance to the past and the future in present action. In 
order to avoid letting an action become a “stupid and opaque fact,” there 
forms an obligation to  
ceaselessly return to it and justify it in the unity of the 
project in which I am engaged. Setting up the movement of 
my transcendence requires that I never let it uselessly fall 
back upon itself, that I prolong it indefinitely. Thus I can 
not genuinely desire an end today without desiring it 
through my whole existence, insofar as it is the future of 
this present moment and insofar as it is the surpassed past 
of days to come.19 
The thrust of American ingenuity, for Beauvoir, is opposed to such 
fidelity to the past and commitment to the future. Rather, the drive is to 
idolize the latest product by denying its past (i.e., its production through labor 
or earlier models of itself) and negating its future (as this product is destined 
to be quickly replaced by a newer one). As Beauvoir points out, a present 
detached from its past and future is a pure abstraction. Americans engage in 
a constant negation of the past in their desperate search for the new. Human 
freedom can not be maintained as a simple denial of the past but requires the 
preservation of it; to transcend is also to preserve. If we cannot maintain a 
living relationship with the past, then the present is merely an “honorary 
corpse” of a future present. Such absence of meaningful connection to the past 
also strips the future of importance and causes movement toward it to become 
an empty flight. 
Americans, then, live time abstractly through the insatiable search for 
novelty: “They want to know only a present that is cut off from the flow of 
time, and the future they project is one that can be mechanically deduced from 
it, not one whose slow ripening or abrupt explosion implies unpredictable 
risks.”20 The moment, as the meeting of time and eternity, is foreign to the 
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American mindset, existing merely to be obliterated. There is no preservation 
of what was and projection of what is to come in the monotonous stream of 
amusements, alcohol, cinema, gadgets, hobbies, and news. In this indefinite 
flight, the underlying feeling is one of loneliness, solitude, and boredom. 
Rushing to escape these feelings, Americans relentlessly reproduce the 
conditions that give rise to them in an endless circular repetition. The denial 
of the past and future in favor of an incessantly new “now” infects the present 
with a kind of stagnation: “every individual existence has a taste of death: 
from minute to minute, the present is merely an honorary past. It must 
constantly be filled with the new to conceal the curse it carries within it.”21 As 
a result, history is a cemetery and ideas die as they are born. 
Just as time, when divorced from the past and any meaningful 
engagement with the future, results in the abstraction of an empty “now,” 
money too serves as the abstract arbiter of value, reducing everything to the 
barest common denominator. Money, rather than concrete achievement 
(making, building, solving, inventing) becomes the standard by which 
humans are valued and judged. As she later elaborates in her autobiography, 
Americans “were incapable of thinking, of inventing, of imagining, of 
choosing, of deciding for themselves; this incapacity was expressed by their 
conformism; in every domain of life they employed only the abstract measure 
of money, because they were unable to trust to their own judgment.”22 
Because of the artificial division between the subjective and objective world, 
money becomes the central definition of worth. The object is only meaningful 
through a dialectical relationship with the subject for whom it is evocative. As 
such, there cannot really be a clearly defined thing that serves as the absolute 
goal in human endeavor. The more distinguishing qualities something has, 
the more it reveals the subjective mode of valuation. Money, however, can 
serve as the measure for all human accomplishments precisely because it is 
an empty symbol. In a culture that struggles to generate concrete values and 
meaningful projects, money provides a tool for evaluating and discerning 
without commitment to anything that could conjure ostracization for 
diverging from the norm.23 Thus Americans elevate money as the primary 
goal for all action precisely because it eclipses the individuality of the subjects 
pursuing it; money equalizes all under the yardstick of wealth. But what can 
one do with abstract time and money except destroy them? Ultimately, a life 
engaged merely in the destruction of abstractions turns out to be an 
undeniably empty life.  
A (White) Existentialist Looks at (Black) Americans 
Beauvoir’s treatment of American abstraction can itself be somewhat 
abstract. There is no dedicated discussion of how different groups live this 
tendency toward abstraction, nor of the consequences for those positioned 
differently in social and economic circles. In fact, which “Americans” 
Beauvoir is talking about is often unclear and misleading. She attempts a more 
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nuanced and careful study of Black Americans than any other people of color 
she observes during her visit, yet, she often makes blanket claims about 
“Americans” when in fact, she means White Americans of a particular social 
and economic standing. This can be partially explained by the fact that she 
was on a four-month college speaking tour, and therefore socializing 
primarily with privileged White Americans, but it does not solve the slippage 
often observed between Americans as a whole, and White and Black 
Americans as subsets.  
In spite of its shortcomings, Beauvoir still offers a significant contribution 
in her critique of American race relations that did not go unnoticed even at 
the time of its first translation in to English in 1952. In 1954, professor of 
romance languages at Howard University, Will Mercer Cook, penned a 
review of America Day by Day, calling the book an interesting addition to 
French observations of the United States. He notes that it is difficult to review 
because of its impressionistic nature and Beauvoir’s adoption of an individual 
existential perspective rather than an absolutist view.24 This is, as Mercer 
notes, problematic insofar as there are no definitive conclusions to draw, but 
also strategic, insofar as it shows a unique cross-cultural analysis that in no 
way claims to be universal. He writes: 
In the midst of debatable generalizations and minute detail 
(which sometimes becomes boring to this reviewer), there 
are brilliant passages in this book, as for example the 
discussions of American literature and some of the analyses 
of the American and his role in the present day world. 
Especially noteworthy are the numerous references to the 
Negro for they reveal the importance that our friends 
abroad attach to American race relations.25 
Mercer highlights Beauvoir’s relationship to Richard and Ellen Wright as 
her main access to American race relations, recalling her visit to the Savoy, the 
Abyssinia Baptist Church, her walking tour of Harlem, and visit to the South. 
While not shying away from its deficiencies, Mercer concludes: “Few 
contemporary studies offer Americans a better opportunity to see ourselves 
as others see us.”26 To be an outsider looking in carries with it the advantages 
of having a perspective not mired in the observed traditions and practices, 
and provides a chance to come to a new level of self-understanding. 
American racism relates directly to Beauvoir’s discussion of abstraction. 
Her own connection to questions of race and ethnicity (directly discussing the 
Jewish, Muslim, Chinese, and Algerian people, among others) can be found 
throughout her works, sometimes producing careful analysis and other times 
careless oversimplification and stereotyping. Black Americans are the most 
consistently addressed and analyzed group in her works from the 1940s. 
Beauvoir uses the term “blacks” as well as “Negroes” in her writings. These 
terms denote those people whom she views as being the inheritors of the 
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abuses of (mostly) American slavery and the those who live under subsequent 
degrees of segregation and oppression.27 Beauvoir’s reliance on Black 
Americans as a primary support for her analysis of oppressive practices has 
been taken to task by a number of scholars, as early as the 1970s.28 More 
recently, Patricia Hill Collins notes that Beauvoir’s heavy reliance on the 
race/gender analogy in the development of her theory of existential freedom 
limits “the imagined possibilities of freedom.”29 Beauvoir repeatedly draws a 
connection between the oppression of American Blacks and women which 
oversimplifies the differences, as well as erases Black women from the 
equation entirely. Kathryn Sophia Belle criticizes that “most often the woman 
that Beauvoir refers to as the Other is a white woman whose subordination is 
being compared to or juxtaposed with the subjugations of men through 
different forms of oppression.”30 Therefore, Beauvoir’s analysis of race 
expunges the different experiences within groups in order to draw blanket 
comparisons between “blacks” and women. While this is most explicit in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, it is also present in America Day by 
Day.31  
Taking both the criticism and the specific existential framework of 
Beauvoir’s observations into account, I turn now to how Beauvoir reads 
American abstraction into the question of race. She states that American 
Blacks are considered to be politically apathetic and resigned to their 
situations, which is a direct product of violence and social intimidation. In this 
way, she shows how the fatalism that affects all Americans, has a unique 
impact on Black Americans. Instead of it being the result of a somewhat 
willful ignorance (as it is with most White Americans) it is the direct result of 
disenfranchisement and social terrorization.  
Additionally, the oppression of Black Americans arises from the overall 
tendency of the culture to systematically degrade time and activity into 
abstract moments and dollars. Once the subject has split from the object, and 
the object raised into an idol robbed of concrete meaning, racism, oppression, 
and tyranny can be accepted, so long as they keep time and cash flowing. 
Without a meaningful, living connection between a subject and their values, 
both become isolated atoms in the social sphere. This means that those who 
serve the advancement of capitalism are reduced to their abstract monetary 
value and, additionally, that the abstraction of temporality obliterates the 
historical violence enacted on populations. As Sonia Kruks notes, “When 
abstraction is a general societal norm, it is also conducive to the reduction of 
others to ‘objective’ categories: to racist pseudoscience and to stereotyping. It 
thus serves to legitimize both economic exploitation and cultural 
appropriation.”32 When the bond between the existent and the world becomes 
an abstraction, the possibilities for unethical behavior multiply and thrive.  
Beauvoir’s view of White Americans on the issue of race and racism is 
almost entirely critical. Other than her experiences with Ellen Wright, who 
struggles to shield her and Richard Wright’s daughter from constant 
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dehumanizing judgment, Beauvoir finds that whiteness in the United States 
is propped up by a feeling of entitlement and artificial superiority. While 
certainly not the first outsider to notice deeply entrenched racism, she offers 
a unique orientation of observation and critique. Very early into her trip she 
attends a party hosted by French ex-patriots, one of whom asks her to promise 
not to write anything about America because it is a complex country and her 
four-month visit could only produce superficial observations. In particular 
she must “‘promise’ to write nothing about the blacks. This is a painful and 
difficult problem on which no one can have an opinion without a wealth of 
information that would require more than one lifetime.”33 And besides, her 
earnest countryman presses, why do the French care so much about Black 
Americans anyway, since White intellectual, artistic, and musical 
accomplishments are far superior? While she does not openly admit that this 
provocation serves as a kind of dare (which it most certainly does), she ignores 
the plea. 
 With these words in the back of her mind, Beauvoir decides to visit 
Harlem on foot despite the warnings that a White woman should never do 
such a thing. Upon entering, she notes that there is a kind of invisible force 
along the border that she names as fear: “Not mine but that of others—the 
fear of all those whites who never take the risk of going to Harlem, who feel 
the presence of a vast, mysterious, and forbidden zone in the northern part of 
their city, where they are transformed into the enemy.”34 The vagueness and 
mystery that she feels is essential, as it signifies American abstraction and the 
erasure of cultural memory. She senses White fear in the present that is built 
upon a foundation of willful historical and cultural expurgation. This 
reappears as a kind of haunting, rather than a concrete social and political 
reality that can be named.  
Seeing people in Harlem living their life on their own terms throws 
Beauvoir back onto herself; no one really cares that she is there. She remains, 
she believes, unnoticed. Harlem is a world on its own. While she is not herself 
frightened, “the fear is there; it weighs on this great popular festivity. 
Crossing the street is, for me, like crossing through layers and layers of fear.”35 
This fear, she points out, emanates from the hearts of other White people, but 
it works in an unusual way, present insofar as it is denied and ignored. “The 
irrational fear they inspire can only be the reverse of hatred and a kind of 
remorse. Planted in the heart of New York, Harlem weighs on the conscience 
of whites like original sin on a Christian.”36 The inability to confront the past 
and present realities of racial oppression takes on a spectral aura surrounding 
the good conscience of White Americans. 
 A critical component of the racist fear that Beauvoir experiences is how 
it hinges on the positive self-image Americans desperately crave. She is 
amazed by how much Americans desire to be in their own good graces. They 
desperately want to be “good” and “happy” and, more importantly, for others 
to think that they are so. Anything that may challenge this fragile, 
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harmonious, self-image is relegated to the outermost fringes of moral 
awareness. Beauvoir claims that White people who are not actively working 
for the overturning of racist structures “try to deny this rupture in the heart 
of their own city; they try to deny Harlem, to forget it. It’s not a threat to the 
future; it’s a wound in the present, a cursed city, the city where they are 
cursed. It’s themselves they’re afraid to meet on the street corners.”37 And the 
“moral discomfort” that pervades is not anomalous, but central to the White 
American psyche.  
 The fear and hatred so evident in New York City becomes even more 
pronounced and appalling once Beauvoir tours the South. Visiting Texas, 
Florida, Louisiana, and Georgia, she observes a marked transition between 
the northern and southern states. Whereas Harlem appeared as a city unto 
itself, with its own class structure and economy, the South is far more vicious 
to her eyes. Savannah exudes its history of colonialization and slavery, 
preserving the past as a dead monument to the brutality that made it what it 
is. Around this city is another one filled with the children of slavery who do 
not simply ignore Beauvoir, but are openly hostile to her presence. She feels 
hatred, rage, and the specter of imminent revolt, forcing her to address the 
“black problem” in America.  
Much of Beauvoir’s ensuing analysis of race in the United States overtly 
borrows from Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 study, An American Dilemma: The Negro 
Problem and Modern Democracy. This book argues that the “black problem” is 
foremost a White problem.38 Beauvoir remarks that thinking on this problem 
causes a sense of danger and discomfort in White people, a sense of guilt, and 
a dread of the reviled “bad conscience.”39 Drawing parallels between French 
colonialists who are able to rationalize contradictory behaviors and opinions 
about the colonized, Beauvoir observes that in either case, the inferiority of 
the oppressed must be construed as a given fact. Rejecting any scientific basis 
to the concept of “race” herself, she finds White Americans are eager to fix 
Black American identity as the contrary to ideal whiteness. This gives rise to 
the ferociousness of stereotyping, segregation, and discrimination. While 
Beauvoir notes that racists “will admit for the most part that the black person 
is not a priori tainted as an individual,” it is clear that “when he leaves his 
station . . . he becomes a danger.”40 In other words, if they maintain their 
status as a thing—cut off from the future and the past—their existence can be 
minimally tolerated; if they exist as an abstraction able to support monetary 
exchange, they have a place. But only insofar as they stay there. Thus, Black 
Americans are inferior, uncultured, lazy, dishonest, and dirty in White 
frameworks and practice. But what does the it mean to “be” something? 
“Does it define an immutable substance, like oxygen? Or does it describe a 
moment in a situation that has evolved, like every human situation?”41 Just as 
she will soon argue about woman in The Second Sex, it is obvious that there is 
an evolution of identity crafted through oppressive practices. To come to 
terms with this reality requires honest reflection and critique, upon which 
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America has built its foundation avoiding. Legally and economically 
disadvantaged, disproportionately impoverished and prey to racist courts, 
voter suppression, and police violence, Beauvoir claims that Black Americans 
succumb to a kind of resignation and adaptation to the intractability of the 
status quo on the one hand, and the smoldering fires of revolt and revolution 
on the other.42 Due to the positioning of Black Americans as inferior and 
menacing, White Americans accede to their own form of resignation in 
accepting the status quo as natural and justified.  
Moving from Abstraction to Concreteness 
As Mary Pepchinski notes, Beauvoir desired to write a different kind of 
French observation on the United States. While Jacques-Laurent Bost and 
Jean-Paul Sartre had also written essays on America, Beauvoir’s distinctive 
position gives her unique access, allowing her to pass through borders that 
others either could or would not. Moving through different spaces, she 
“desired to test the extent of her freedom to comprehend the mechanisms of 
racial separation.”43 This final section explores how Beauvoir’s positionality 
(as a White, educated, foreign, middle-aged woman) grants her access not 
only to critique, but also to phenomenologically and experientially 
undergoing the movement from racial abstraction to concreteness. She begins 
as a kind of ethereal renegade rule-breaker in New York City and ends as a 
relatively self-aware bearer of whiteness in the South. Her journey—from 
alien spectator to one who cannot avoid the way in which her facticity shapes 
her views—is central to both her critique of America and her 
acknowledgment of herself as a part of the story. 
In order to read Beauvoir’s experience as one moving from abstraction to 
concreteness requires reading her meditations on race strategically. As Robert 
Bernasconi argues, “her writing on race must be seen in the same terms during 
the process of which she gradually came to an understanding of her own 
racial prejudices.”44 Taking into account her acknowledged finite position, 
her journey is one wherein she moves from the abstraction of a bodyless gaze 
to being a White person. Her whiteness marks her for others—either as an ally 
or enemy—or, more importantly, as one who cannot neutrally observe from 
afar. Beauvoir’s real contribution is not, consequently, a theoretical analysis 
of racism (which is borrowed largely from Myrdal’s work) but the lived 
experience of hatred, shame, and guilt awakening her to her own place in the 
question of race in America. In this way, the abstract race problem becomes 
concretized in her very body. 
Beauvoir’s initial experiences are common for most who visit a foreign 
country for the first time. There is a sharpness to feeling completely out of 
place. “My presence is a borrowed presence. There is no place for me on these 
sidewalks. This strange world where I’ve landed by surprise was not waiting 
for me. It was full without me; it is full without me. It is a world where I am 
not: I grasp it in my perfect absence.”45 This breathtaking description of a new 
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place and a new culture is illuminating yet, admittedly, not one that can be 
maintained. With time and engagement, absence becomes anchored in time 
and space. As Beauvoir wakes the next day, she muses that “No one here is 
concerned with my presence; I’m still a ghost, and I slip through the city 
without disturbing anything,”46 yet her ghostlike existence rapidly begins to 
concretize. She begins with observations of the visual presentation of the city 
and then quickly takes to explore by foot. While she upholds her position of 
remote observer for much of the adventure, her examinations on race force 
her to confront the artificiality living as abstractly.  
D. Rita Alfonso notes that Beauvoir’s own status as a self-proclaimed 
outsider is impossible to maintain insofar as the race problem is not just a 
White problem, nor is it merely an American problem. Alfonso charts 
Beauvoir’s journey as she moves from unmarked “ghost” in New York, 
passing boundaries of neighborhoods and race, to experiencing her whiteness 
stinging her skin in Texas. Whereas Beauvoir felt empowered to travel 
through Harlem unscathed, the experience of segregation in the South 
physically affects her: “This is the first time we’re seeing with our own eyes 
the segregation that we’ve heard so much about. And although we’d been 
warned, something fell onto our shoulders that would not lift all through the 
South; it was our skin that became heavy and stifling, its color making us 
burn.”47 In the middle of the Texas dessert, the segregated bathrooms, waiting 
rooms, and restaurants throw her back onto herself and cause much more 
than a moment of detached reflection. Rather, she undergoes an acutely 
embodied and affective event. Her whiteness enfolds her body and refuses to 
leave for the rest of the southern journey. In the Texas desert, “Beauvoir’s 
status as an outsider disintegrates.”48 The whiteness scalding her skin “is a 
moment of authenticity that readies her for the task of becoming a witness to 
oppression.”49 This confrontation cannot simply be theorized away, as it is 
scratches itself into her body, constituting an inescapable dimension of her 
facticity, and altering the discussions of race in the remainder of the book. 
This presents a kind of movement from abstraction to concreteness that—
whether intentionally or not—models a movement that Beauvoir believes 
Americans cannot, but should, make. 
The weight of her whiteness increases as she continues further into the 
“great tragedy of the South.”50 On a bus trip from New Orleans to Savannah, 
she perceives more hatred and jealousy between Black and White Americans. 
She witnesses the physical segregation of the bus and the waiting rooms, the 
total lack of care for a fainting pregnant Black woman in distress, and the 
hostility from the Black communities through which the bus travels. Finally, 
Beauvoir feels the intense discomfort of her own whiteness in the Black belt 
around Savannah. There, she and her companion, Natalie Sorokine, are the 
objects of the Look, feeling hatred and rage focused on their presence: “As we 
go by, voices drop, gestures stop, smiles die: all life is suspended in the depths 
of those angry eyes.”51 It comes as a relief to break the tension of the gaze 
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when an old woman spits twice at their presence and a little girl runs away 
calling them “enemies.” There is no escaping the lived, affective experience of 
her whiteness in these moments, even if she fails to fully own them.  
While the bulk of White Americans she meets along her journey do not 
engage in authentic self-reflection, Beauvoir’s writing shows us that she does. 
Her experiences of whiteness in the south force her to become a temporal 
being who must confront the realities of the past of the United States. In this 
vein, Beauvoir criticizes the characterization of the United States as a “young” 
country, still in its childhood and thus somewhat “innocent” in its 
engagements. She warns that this childish adoption of serious, sedimented 
values in an adult culture is not mere naïveté, but the result of a deliberate 
carelessness that is both morally reprehensible and politically treacherous. 
“It’s sometimes said that America is the country of youth. I’m not so sure. Real 
young people are engaged in moving toward the future of mankind, not 
enclosing themselves in the complacent resignation that’s been assigned to 
them.”52 This kind of complacency and temporal denial is precisely what 
gives rise to the anti-Black racism woven into the very fabric of the nation. 
Beauvoir learns, and through her education we learn as well, that the 
abstraction cannot be maintained when history is etched onto one’s very 
body. 
Finally, a decisive experience of race occurs in Chicago toward the 
conclusion of her stay. In a brutal and stark trip to a slaughterhouse, Beauvoir 
comes to see the concrete realities of race and money. Aware of the American 
tendency to idolize the result of labor without concern for the laborers who 
create it, the slaughterhouse reveals to her an alarming truth. Time (the 
unquenchable thirst for speed and consumption) and money (the exploitation 
of vulnerable populations in capitalist enterprise) come to a head in this visit. 
Calling it an “enormous concentration camp,” she notes that the treatment of 
the animals is a pure abstraction from their living materiality. Their horrific 
death is neatly transformed into abstract monetary numbers and tidy 
packages for sale. She observes that “the gap that separates the world of profit 
from the world of work is more obvious here than elsewhere.”53  
The heat, dull light, and violence on display dramatically effect her. The 
smell alone causes a nausea that pervades the tour. And while stirred by the 
travesty of the animal slaughter, she is far more moved by the Black bodies 
who are doing the grisly work. She observes that it is “no accident that the 
bloody arms carving up the carcasses are nearly all black arms under their 
red-stained gloves.” These bloodied arms call up the forgotten history of labor 
strikes and racial battles in which, ultimately, Black Americans were the 
losers.54 In sum, “this colossal slaughter is the visible tragedy, but it’s only the 
symbol of another, crueler, deeper tragedy. In order to live, man consumes 
non-human lives, but he also feeds on the lives of other humans.”55 Here, 
Beauvoir’s insight into time, money, and race reach a crescendo, and she 
speaks in the most concrete, carnal words she can muster. While Americans 
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can treat these matters as abstractions, Beauvoir’s journey has led her to a 
point where she lives the full, undeniable weight of the circumstances. As 
such, she provides a model for a kind of existential conversion wherein the 
chasm between what one “is” and what one “is not” must be assumed, rather 
than surpassed or denied. As Beauvoir accepts her position as a White woman 
in America, she accepts the failure of being a disembodied observer and the 
ethical onus to avoid abstraction herself. In so doing, she enacts a constructive 
movement of assuming freedom, and a negative movement that rejects 
oppression in oneself as others: “in construction, as in rejection, it is a matter 
of reconquering freedom on the contingent facticity of existence, that is, of 
taking the given, which, at the start, is there without any reason, as something 
willed by man.”56 Such work is never finished, but involves a constant 
struggle to avoid the dangers of seriousness and abstraction. 
Conclusion  
 “The American,” Beauvoir writes, “is afraid of that cold isolation, of that 
dereliction into which man falls when he splits off from what is given.” Yet, 
she continues, “from this kind of separation the drama of human existence is 
born.”57 Lacking the drive or awareness to separate from the given, much of 
the populace is manipulatable, either enacting or suffering exploitation and 
degradation. Plagued by the boredom, isolation, and solitude resulting from 
the emptiness of novelties and wealth, the American people become defeatist 
and resigned to the present state of affairs. Certainly, different populations 
suffer resignation in different ways. According to Beauvoir, White Americans 
are resigned to the repetition of the status quo that keeps them in power and 
Black Americans are largely resigned to the oppressive practices that keep 
them down. Regardless, the isolation and manipulation affects everyone, 
denuding existence of passion and engagement, and promoting tyranny and 
violence through unchecked demonstrations of power. 
The expression of transcendent freedom through creation and revolt is 
thus culturally stymied at every turn in so many aspects of American life. As 
a result, “there is no place for authentically revolutionary action in America; 
at this point in time, one must be resigned to a wait-and-see policy.”58 Action 
is robbed of meaning when it stands cut off from time and the things it 
produces. This helps to explain why Beauvoir both sees the possibility of 
“immanent revolt” in Black Americans (particularly in the South) and a kind 
of resignation that overlays oppressed and complicit groups. When time, 
money, and race are lived abstractly, the motivation for change suffers a kind 
of indefinite postponement. This uneasy complacency encourages the 
oppressed to suffer in silence and those in power to stay the course.  
Although she would never claim that Americans as a whole are 
oppressed, they do suffer under a kind of cultural mystification. Whether or 
not she is right about this, or even had a broad enough knowledge of social 
movements for change that were active at the time, she speaks to how 
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America discloses itself in her experience. In the Ethics, she tells us that the 
attitude of seriousness shares a close bond with tyranny. She warns that: 
The serious man is dangerous. It is natural that he makes 
himself a tyrant. Dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his 
choice, he pretends that the unconditioned value of the 
object is being asserted through him; and by the same token 
he also ignores the value of the subjectivity and the freedom 
of others, to such an extent that, sacrificing them to the 
thing, he persuades himself that what he sacrifices is 
nothing.59 
Through violence, intimidation, and disenfranchisement, the ugly work 
of serious-mindedness churns out oppressive structures and does so by 
claiming they are ahistorical abstract absolutes that cannot be meaningfully 
changed. The abstractions of time and money in turn generate abstract ideals 
(such as equality, freedom, and goodness) that fail to account for historical 
accretion and capitalist exploitation. With the profound separation of 
individuals in space, time, and labor, comes the propensity to forget past 
history —willfully or ignorantly—and the inability to envision ethical futures. 
As a result, the majority of Americans are “content to let their lives go round 
in the same circle. They have neither the taste nor the understanding for 
collective life; nor are they concerned about their individual fates. This is the 
source of the sadness I’ve often felt around them; this world that’s full of 
generous promise is crushing them.”60  
In describing the politics of American democracy she observes that “the 
sad truth is that the ‘general interest’ applies only to a ‘private’ category of 
citizens—those who profit from the ruling elite and who intend to go on 
profiting. And the others are free only to the extent that they submit, which is 
the most abstract of freedoms.”61 Conformity to abstractions maintains a kind 
of treadmill where energy that could otherwise go to creative social and 
individual projects, dissipates in mere existence.62 A passive, thoughtless 
populace is not only easy to deploy and control, but is also complicit in the 
abuse of vulnerable communities. 
Given the current social and political landscape of the United States, 
Beauvoir provides a timely meditation on a problem that has deep historical 
roots. The struggles against anti-Black racism in America often have to 
contend with a deep denial of history and a capitalist system that sees human 
beings in terms of profit or loss. Slavery created a legacy of violence and 
inequality that continues to negatively and directly affect employment, 
housing, education, policing, wealth, and representation. To argue for the 
presence of the past in current affairs requires disarming the vociferous claims 
that the past is the past, and all such abuses have either been rectified or are 
no longer relevant. To deny that the present enshrines the past is to fall prey 
to the very tendencies of abstraction Beauvoir criticized over seventy years 
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ago. Her critique of time, money, and race is every bit as relevant today, in 
some ways even more so, as it reveals how pernicious and long standing the 
American tendency toward abstraction is, and the dangerousness of refusing 
to engage in honest self-critique. 
Beauvoir’s evaluation of the United States expands her understanding of 
the ways in which freedom can dissipate itself into abstractions rather than 
engage itself in concrete action. The artificial elevation of the object over the 
valuating subject severs the necessary link between existent and world and 
allows for the proliferation of abstractions such as the empty moment and the 
almighty dollar to which people swear allegiance. Such adherence to the 
thinnest of human creations allows for the indefinite flight from the very 
freedom and responsibility that Beauvoir’s existentialism promotes, creating 
mystification, racial oppression, and deep social divisions. What she offers 
Americans is the experience of one individual who undergoes the 
concretization of race through confronting the realities of history and 
exploitation. While it is not a universal solution, it is an enactment of authentic 
self-reflection and change. She offers, in short, a picture of existential 
conversion and ethical commitment. 
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